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I n	the	philosophy	of	perception,	a	venerable	tradition	transfixes	on	perceptual relativities,	the	fact	that	in	some	sense	the	ways	things	appear	to	us	in	perception	change	as	a	number	of	perceptual	vari-

















modestly,	 those	 entranced	 by	 perceptual	 relativities	 may	 seek	 to	
1.	 Another,	 perhaps	more	 familiar,	way	 is	 to	 account	 for	 these	 relativities	 in	
ways	that	do	not	conflict	with	direct	realism	or	colour	objectivism.	I	take	one	
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precisely	 that.	 In	such	a	case	one	experiences	both	a	variable	and	a	
constant	 colour	 along	 the	 same	 line	 of	 sight,	 thus	meeting	 the	 VC	
Challenge	in	a	direct	way.
We	proceed	as	follows:
§1 A brief history of colour constancy and a contextual motive for 
the layering account are offered.
§2 Theoretical constraints that seek to avoid the dialectical gulf 
mentioned above are identified.
§3 An analysis of the concept perspective on a colour that can un-
derwrite colour constancy is offered.
§4 The analysis from §3 is applied to colour constancy and the 
layering account is developed.
§5 The proposed account is contrasted with two alternative views.
§6 The discussion is summarized.
Some	qualifications	will	be	helpful.
The	core	sense	of	“transparent”	relevant	to	the	Layering	Thesis	is	











explain	 constancies	 indirectly,	 for	 example	 by	 appeal	 to	mental	 dis-
positions	to	make	judgements,	instead	of	directly	by	appeal	to	aspects	
of	what	is	presently	perceived.	Within	our	focus	of	colour	theory	we	
see	 this	 in	Cohen’s	 (2008)	 attempt	 to	 explain	 colour	 constancies	 in	
terms	 of	 the	mind’s	 disposition	 to	make	 counterfactual	 judgements	
about	 colour	appearances.	The	converse	can	be	 found	 in	colour	ob-
jectivists	like	Byrne	and	Hilbert	[B&H]	(1997a,	2003;	see	also	Hilbert	
2005),	who	assert	that	colour	relativities	can	be	broadly	(if	not	wholly)	
explained	by	 the	mind’s	disposition	 to	misrepresent	actual	 constant	
colours.	For	neither	is	the	opposing	phenomenon	—	constancy	for	Co-
hen,	 relativity	 for	B&H	—	indicative	of	 correctly	perceived	occurrent	
features;	it	is	instead	indicative	of	our	perceptually	representing	some-
thing	other	than	what	is	currently	perceived.	







the	Variable-Constant Challenge or	simply	the	VC Challenge.	My	answer	
is	drawn	from	the	following	thesis:
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reconstruction	 in	§1	 (and	continued	references	 throughout)	with	an	
eye	 on	 illuminating	 influential	 philosophical	 accounts	 of	 constancy,	
the	importance	of	the	VC	Challenge,	and	my	proposed	solution.	




colour	 of	 a	 hat	 both	 indoors	 and	outdoors,	 both	 in	 daylight	 and	 in	







below.	My	present	purpose	 is	 stage-setting,	 to	 summarize	points	of	
recent	philosophical	interest	and	their	drawbacks.
Consider	the	definition	of	colour	constancy	given	by	B&H	in	their	
influential	 Readings in Colour:	 “Stability	 of	 the	 perceived	 color	 of	 a	






present	 in	 scientific	 research	 on	 colour	 constancy,	 and	 it	 is	 doubly	
problematic.	Let	me	explain.

















relativities	—	the	 possibility	 of	 spectrum	 inversion,	 intersubjective	
variabilities	 in	unique	hue	perceptions,	 and	 so	on	—	are	a	key	piece	
of	the	puzzle	that	is	colour,	but	affect	our	theorizing	in	different	ways	
than	are	my	focus.
Several	 issues	 regarding	 colour	 constancy	will	 not	 be	 addressed.	









the	phenomenon	cannot	be	 straightforward.	 I	 cannot	work	 through	







6.	 Note	that	“intentional”	 in	this	sense	 is	 intended	to	be	consistent	both	with	
representational	 and	 acquaintance-based	 approaches	 to	 perception.	 See	
below.






























possible	 (and	plausible)	 that	 such	 systems	 evolved	 to	 give	 their	 owners	 a	
more	 efficient	 class	 of	 properties	—	colours	—	with	which	 to	 cognize	 about	
the	world	than	the	world	itself	contains.	On	such	a	view	what	such	systems	












is	the	object’s	or	surface’s	propensity	to	reflect	 light	(i. e.,	 its	surface	
spectral	 reflectance	 profile,	 or	 SSR).	 This	 affords	 a	 straightforward	
empirical	research	programme	for	studying	colour	constancy.7	What	
the	eye	receives	from	the	world	(i. e.,	 the	colour	signal)	 is	 light	that	















8.	 Psychologists	 sometimes	 distinguish	 between	 mechanistic	 and	 computa-






emphasized,	 the	 two	are	merely	 focusing	on	different	aspects	of	 the	 same	






proach	are	often	embroiled	 in	how	adaptation	works	 in	our	vision	 system,	
whereas	those	working	within	the	computational	approach	are	embroiled	in	
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concessions	do	not	 resolve	at	 least	one	core	challenge:	 in	what	 re-
spect	 is	 a	 constant	 colour	present	 to	 one	 in	 experiences	 involving	
colour	constancy?	For	example,	during	some	constancy	perceptions	
involving	a	partly	shadowed	surface	it	is	not	a	stretch	to	suggest	that	





















§1.2 Problem one: Experiencing illumination variations & experiencing them 
as colour variations. 
One	might	argue	that	what	I	have	called	the	traditional	computational	















Consider	 also	 the	 fact	 that	 illumination	 variations	 can	 yield	 per-
ceived	variations	in	colour,	but	need	not	thereby	eliminate	colour	con-
stancy.	At	times	a	room	illuminated	by	a	red	twilight	can	still	be	seen	to	


















through	another.	The	 idea	 is,	at	 least	 logically,	 readily	generalizable	




analysis	of	 the	 respect	 in	which	constant	and	variable	elements	are	
phenomenally	and	intentionally	present	to	one	in	experiences	involv-
ing	colour	constancy.	Let	us	flesh	it	out.
§2 Balancing theoretical pressures
The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	tease	apart	the	relation	between	colour	
constancy	and	colour	ontology	and	epistemology	on	one	hand,	and	
colour	 constancy	and	colour	experience	on	 the	other.	 It	 strikes	me	
of	everyday	scenarios,	 then	colour	constancy	cannot	be	offered	as	a	
reason	to	be	a	Reflectance	Physicalist.15
§1.3 Problem two: Colour constancy without illumination variation. 
Matters	are	still	more	difficult,	for	a	host	of	colour	constancy	percep-
tions	 have	 nothing to do with illumination variations. Look	 at	 a	 book	
through	a	pint	of	amber	beer	and	at	times	you	see	not	only	the	beer’s	
amber	but	also	 the	book’s	green	(Image	1,	Book	 through	beer).	The	


































surprise	 that	Cohen	 (2009)	 elsewhere	defends	 a	 colour	 subjectivist	
ontology,	in	his	case	holding	that	colours	are	defined	relative	to	illu-
minations	and	a	host	of	other	factors.18
These	are	but	 two	of	 the	ways	 that	colour	constancy	can	be	ana-
lyzed.	It	is	instructive	to	highlight	that	each	way	embodies	a	bias	that	
favours	 the	broader	colour	ontology	 favoured	by	 its	authors.	B&H’s	
claim	 that	 in	 constancy	 scenarios	 experienced	 (“perceived”)	 colours	
are	stable	or	constant	provides	reason	to	regard	colours	as	invariant	









one	might	worry	 that	 this	 commitment	makes	 judgements	 about	 a	
proposed	analysis	hostage	 to	a	 further	 judgement	 that	 is	difficult	 to	






herently	or	 constitutively	depend	on	 the	mind	and	 the	world	 (e. g.,	Cohen	
2009),	and	mentalist	views	on	which	colours	inherently	or	constitutively	de-
pend	only	on	the	mind	(e. g.,	Hardin	1988,	McGilvray	1994).






while	 remaining	 quite	 neutral	 on	 commitments	 to	 colour	 ontology	
and	epistemology	(§4).
§2.1 Ontological bias. 
Regardless	of	B&H’s	ultimate	commitment	to	their	definition	of	con-
stancy	 (“Stability	of	 the	perceived	 color	of	 a	 surface	across	 changes	
in	illumination	and	the	consequent	changes	in	the	light	reaching	the	
eye”),	 that	definition	favours	the	constant	element	over	the	variable	










By	 contrast	 Cohen’s	 (2008)	 account	 of	 constancy	 splits	 colour	





tiated)	 vary	 across	 illumination	 changes,	 and	 evidence	 for	 constant	
colours	 in	 these	scenarios	 is	evidence	of	colours	 that	are	not before	
17.	 ‘Evidence’	for	example	includes	data	from	everyday	experience	and	from	ex-
periments	such	as	those	utilizing	asymmetric	matching	tasks.







an	occurrent	content	is	experienced	as	there	or	real or	present before one, 
whereas	one	that	occurs	in	a	counterfactual	content	is	experienced	as	
not there/absent but	potentially there.	Given	this	framework	Cohen’s	key	
proposal	is	that	in	constancy	cases	variable	elements	of	colour	experi-
ence	are	found	in	occurrent	contents,	and	constant	elements	are	found	







I	 do	 so	 because	 the	Present	 accounts	 available	 are	 to	my	mind	 in-
adequate,	and	their	distinctness	from	colour	ontology	has	not	been	

















considering	 for	 this	 reason	 alone.	 If	 in	 addition	 it	 explains	 the	 phe-
nomenon	of	colour	constancy	at	least	as	well	as	its	competitors,	then	it	
deserves	a	privileged	place	in	our	discourse.








given	case	experientially realist or	Present constancy	accounts,	and those	









proposition	 about	 a	 constant	 colour,	 perhaps	 <that	 thing’s	 colour	 is	
constant	though	not	currently	perceptually	so>	or	<that	thing’s	colour	
would	be	perceivably	constant	were	it	uniformly	illuminated>.	
A	 more	 sophisticated	 Absent	 view	 posits	 that	 the	 constant	 ele-





elaborate.	 For	Cohen,	 colour	 experience	 is	 split	 into	 experiences	 of	
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§3 Perspectives on colours
There	is	a	conceptual	problem	underlying	an	experientially	realist	or	
Present	understanding	of	colour	constancy,	 the	problem	of	articulat-





forthcoming,	 the	 proposed	 analysis	 derives	 directly	 from	 the	 Layer-
ing	Thesis.	The	analysis	is	fruitful	because	it	requires	few	assumptions,	




Understanding	the	concept	perspectives on a colour is	particularly	prob-
lematic	 given	 the	 following	 tension.	On	one	hand	 there	 is	 intuitive	























spective,	and	when	viewed	outdoors	 it	 is	experienced	 from	another	
perspective.	 Similarly	 for	 the	 book:	 by	 hypothesis	 the	 experienced	


























scenarios.	 It	 is	 theoretically	permissive	because	 it	 is	 consistent	with	
not	only	objectivist	but	also	subjectivist	 colour	ontologies	and	with	
various	perceptual	epistemologies.	The	account	centers	on	analyzing	
the	concept	having a perspective on a colour.	It	is	to	this	that	we	now	turn.

















sell’s	 Sentiments	 is	 to	 concede	 defeat	 and	 allow	 the	 respective	 par-
ties	to	part	ways.	Here	each	party	operationally	assumes	that	colours	
do	(or	do	not)	admit	of	perspectives,	and	utilizes	that	assumption	in	









contexts,	and	asserts	 that	 this	 is	a	 legitimate	sense	 in	which	we	can	
have	different	perspectives	on	a	colour.	Applied	to	colour	constancy	
this	 yields	 an	 Absent	 or	 experientially	 anti-realist	 account,	 for	 the	
stability	of	the	colour	on	which	the	subject	has	different	perspectives	







on	across	distinct	contexts	(e. g.,	under	different	 illuminations),	 then	
colour	is	invariant	across	these	contexts	(e. g.,	 illuminations).	That	is,	




On	 the	other	hand	 there	 is	 intuitive	motivation	 to	deny	 that	we	
can	 have	 perspectives	 on	 a	 given	 colour,	 to	 say	 for	 example	 that	 if	
something	appears	blue	at	one	time,	and	purple	at	another,	then	we	
haven’t	witnessed	different	perspectives	on	 the	object’s	 blue	 colour,	




Here	 is	one	way	 to	develop	Russell’s	 thought.	Consider	 the	various	
properties	that	have	been	offered	to	describe	colours,	most	famously	
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In	a	manner	of	speaking,	our	parties	are	now	conceptually	disen-
gaged	 from	each	other.	However,	 rather	 than	viewing	 this	as	an	un-
avoidable	outcome	from	philosophical	debate,	this	resconstruction	of	
why	that	disengagement	arose	suggests	how	reengagement	is	achiev-
able	—	via	a	Present	conception	of	perspectives on a colour.	
§3.2. Perspective through interdependence. 
Rather	 than	 explore	 various	means	 of	 generating	 a	 Russell-friendly	
analysis	of	the	concept	perspectives on a colour let	me	state	my	proposal,	
that	embodied	by	the	Layering	Thesis:
Colour Layering Thesis:	 we	 can	 experience	 two	 colours	
along	a	single	line	of	sight,	one	(opaque)	colour	through	
the	other	(transparent)	colour.
The	Thesis	intrinsically	contains	an	analysis	of	perspectives on a colour:	
when	you	experience	one	colour	 through	another	you	are	not	expe-




on	 one’s	 experience	 of	 the	 other.	 And	 as	 one	 experiences	 differing	
opaque	 colours	 through	 this	 transparent	 colour,	 one	 gets	 differing	
perspectives	on	the	latter;	and	vice	versa.
This	analysis	of	perspectives on colours is	ontologically	very	liberal.	It	
is	consistent	with	colours	being	mental,	nowhere	instantiated,	mind-







Finally,	 it	 is	 independent	from	various	other	colour	phenomena.	For	
underlying	or	giving	rise	to	these	experiences.	Thus	the	blueness	of	
the	blue	object	is	only	experienced	when	the	object	looks	blue.	When	





conception	of	perspectives on a colour,	but	the	Absent	character	of	that	
conception.	The	reason	is	plain:	an	Absent	conception	of	perspectives 
on a colour	 cannot	 in	 any	 direct	way	 provide	 evidence	 for	 one	 actu-
ally	 having	 different	 perspectives	 on	 a	 colour.	 The	Russellian	 Senti-
mentalist	 thus	views	the	conception	as	 inherently	question-begging,	
and	any	colour	objectivism	founded	on	it	as	inheriting	this.24	But	this	
concern,	 legitimate	as	 it	 is,	does	not	 license	the	conclusion	that	any	











24.	A	classic	dispositionalist	 response	 is	 to	utilize	 the	Objectivist’s	 conception	
and	identify	one	of	the	variable	experienced	colours	with	the	real	colour	of	
the	thing	(e. g.,	the	one	experienced	in	“normal	conditions”).	The	Russellian	




whether	acceptable	or	not,	 concedes	 that	 there	 is	not	a	constant	colour	 in	
one’s	phenomenology	across	 the	relevant	circumstances	and	 then	seeks	 to	
find	a	way	around	the	ensuing	problems.	I	aim	to	not	make	this	concession.





(2)	Colour	 constancy	 can	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 filter	 variations	






ible	 within	 various	 ontologies	 and	 epistemologies	 is,	 all	
else	being	equal,	preferable	(§2).




reference	 the	 latter	 are	 deemed	 instances	 of	 Present con-
stancy	(§2).






§4.2 Layered constancy. 
























behind	 the	 target	 colour.	 I	 suggest	 that	even	Russell	would	be	 chal-
lenged	to	reject	the	proposal.
§4 Layered experience and colour constancy




















While	Layering	Present	 constancy	 is	 simply	 stated,	 the	 extent	 to	
which	it	occurs	may	require	extended	discussion.	 It	 is	reasonable	to	




























in	 an	 experientially	 realistic	 colour	 constancy	 scenario:	 the	 constant	
colour	is	a	constituent	of	what	she	experiences.	Call	it	a	Layered (Con-
stancy) scenario, and	the	experiences	such	a	subject	undergoes	Layered 
(Constancy) experiences. The	constant	colour	is	not	 inferred	from	what	
she	experiences;	it	is	not	explained	by	postulating	an	expressed	coun-





lable	 in	 subjectivist	 colour	 ontologies	 (e. g.,	 sense-datum	 theory)	 as	
in	objectivist	ones	 (e. g.,	objectivist	physicalism),	and	amenable	 to	a	
variety	of	perceptual	theories	(e. g.,	representationalism,	indirect	real-
ism,	naïve	realism)	and	perceptual	phenomena.	For	example,	it	does	
not	matter	whether	 the	 layers	are	 sense-data	or	physical	objects,	or	
whether	 one’s	 perceptions	 are	 best	 described	 via	 representation	 or	
acquaintance.	All	 that	matters	 is	 that	one	engages	 in	experiences	of	
colour	 layers	 in	which	one	of	 the	 layers	remains	constant	while	 the	
other	changes.	The	dictates	of	(3)	are	thus	met.
Finally,	 it	 should	be	obvious	 that	 this	 account	has	 the	generality	
needed	 to	accommodate	 (1)&(2).	 If we	 treat	 illuminants,	filters,	and	
(non-filter)	surfaces	as	colour-bearing	entities27,	and	treat	illuminants	
and	filters	as	transparent	and	surfaces	as	opaque,	then	we	can	explain	
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visual	 system	 to	 express	 a	 counterfactual	 content	 of	 the	 loose	 form	















scenarios	 in	which	 the	 subject	 distinctly	 experiences	 two	 complete,	
layered	 colours	 (e. g.,	 the	 green	 of	 the	 book	 through	 the	 amber	 of	
the	 beer).	 Call	 these	 complete layered	 experiences.	 Here	 are	 some	
alternatives:	
A. Layering failure:	 the	subject	experiences	not	distinct	colours	
along	the	line	of	sight,	but	one	fused	colour.29 















and	 thus	 report	colour	constancy,	but	 such	a	 report	would	not	be	a	
mere	description	of	one’s	experience,	 it	would	 instead	be	 the	 result	
of	a	substantive	inference	from	what	is	experientially	present.	If	one	
applies	Cohen’s	notion	of	a	counterfactual	colour	content	to	the	case,	
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objects	 in	 the	 lot.)	What	we	do	not	experience	 is	 the	 full	colours	of	
the	objects	in	the	lot:	their	hues	(and	possibly	saturations)	are	not	ex-
perienced.	Nonetheless,	these	various	lightnesses	are	experienced	as	





There	 are	 many	 aspects	 of	 this	 description	 that	 dissenters	 and	
skeptics	will	find	troublesome.	While	I	naturally	sympathize	with	the	
description,	what	is	of	primary	importance	to	philosophical	discourse	





hues	 (or	 saturations).	 Either	way	Present	 constancy	obtains	 and	 it	 obtains	
because	of	layering.
uncontroversial.	This	 last	 issue	 is	 in	particular	very controversial	 for	
philosophy.	For	example,	a	colour	subjectivist	(e. g.,	sense-datum	the-
orist,	 relationalist,	etc.)	may	assert	 that	no	misperception	 is	present:	









§4.3.2 Incomplete layered experiences
Image	3	(Scene	through	blue	glass)	is	an	image	of	a	parking	lot	as	seen	
through	what	we	pretheoretically	designate	as	a	highly	saturated	blue	
pane	of	glass.	 I	propose	that	 it	 is	 inappropriate	 to	describe	a	 typical	
colour	experience	of	 this	 image	as	only	containing	various	different	










colour.31	 It	 is	 a	 saturated	blue.	We	also	experience	 the	various	 light-
nesses	of	the	objects	in	the	parking	lot.	(If	you	doubt	this	spend	a	mo-






















and	 for	 acquaintance-based	 views	 that	 exclude	 accuracy	 and	 error	
from	experience.	It	is	also	formulable	within	sense-datum	theory	and	
other	 subjectivist	 views	—	although	whether	 it	would	be	welcomed	
by	advocates	of	such	theories	I	will	not	pause	to	consider.
To	 respect	 symmetry	 we	 should	 consider	 the	 reverse	 possibil-
ity,	where	 the	natures	of	 the	opaque	colours	are	 fully	present	 in	ex-
perience	while	the	natures	of	the	transparent	ones	are	only	partially	
























sense	they	are	not	present	 in	experience,	only	 their	 lightnesses	are.	
It	is	important	to	recognize	that	no	attribution	of	error	is	needed	to	
understand	 this	 kind	 of	 experience.	 Here	 are	 two	means	 of	 insert-
ing	 error.	One	might	deny	 that	 one	 can	have	 a	 layered	 experience	
when	viewing	 this	 image,	 in	which	 case	 the	 surfaces	 seen	 through	































Regarding	 Incomplete	 layered	 experiences,	 candidate	 stimuli	





lightnesses	of	 the	surfaces	are.	Regarding	 the	 latter,	and	by	analogy	
with	various	sunglass	cases,	the	full	colour	of	a	 lightly	saturated	red	









§4.4 Extension to Illumination
Some	 readers	may	worry	 that	while	 the	Layering	approach	 is	 intui-
tive	for	Filter	cases,	its	application	to	Illumination	cases	is	unintuitive	
and	potentially	problematic.	A	layering	analysis	of	Illumination	cases	
entails	 that:	 experienced	 illuminants	 and	 (non-filter)	 surfaces	 are	
colour	bearers34;	 these	 illuminants	are	transparent,	and	surfaces	are	
opaque;	we	experience	 these	 illuminants	by	 looking	 through	 them	
to	these	surfaces,	and	experience	these	surfaces	by	looking	at	them	







and	Fusion	experiences	 to	 Illumination	 cases	 is	 logically	 straightfor-











34.	Or,	 for	 the	 subjectivist,	 causes	 of,	 or	 erroneously	 represented	 as,	 colour	
bearers.
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As	 discussed	 in	 §1,	 the	 idea	 that	 Illumination	 variations	 merely	
“reach	the	eye”	is	no	longer	a	live	option	in	discussions	of	colour	con-
stancy.	At	 least	 some	 of	 the	 illumination	 variations	 relevant	 to	 con-





in	 a	 particular	 way	—	as	 transparent.37	 Regarding	 3.,	 experienced	 il-
luminants	can	be	thin	sheets	(e. g.,	flat	shadows)	or	thicker	volumes	













































such	 to	perceivers,	where	what	 is	 “obvious”	 can	vary	depending	on	
factors	 like	 background	knowledge,	 training,	 priming,	 and	 so	 on.	A	
Layering	approach	to	Illumination	cases	would	place	many	standard	













would	be	needed	 to	 test	 a	 Layering	 approach	 to	 Illumination	 cases.	





Casati	 (2009)	 rejects	 the	general	 transparency	of	 shadows	but	 is	
not	 concerned	 specifically	 with	 colour	 constancy.	 Here	 is	 the	 core	
argument:
(1) “[S]hadows can be seen as shadows even though they do not 
straddle a luminance boundary.”





philosophers	 until	 recently.	 In	 psychology,	 for	 example,	 layered	 vi-
sual	 experiences	—	scissions	—	have	 been	 of	 particular	 interest	 since	
the	1970s.40	Here	the	focus	is	often	on	perceptual	cues	that	are	likely	





es	must	 be	 straightforwardly	 introspectively	 accessible	 as	 such	 (e. g.,	












39.	For	example,	in	Colour for Philosophers Hardin	calls	colour	constancy	“far	from	
properly	explained”,	and	doesn’t	propose	to	resolve	the	matter	(1988,	82).	See	
again	Shevell	&	Kingdom	(2008)	for	a	recent	review.
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philosophical	nature	of	this	work,	I	will	settle	for	the	plausible	consis-
































(2) “[B]ut straddling a boundary is [required42] for a transparent 
surface to be perceived.”




































constancy	 experiences	—	some	may	well	 be	 indicative	of	 counterfac-
tual	constancy	contents.	 It	 is	 that	Layered	cases	plausibly	exist,	and	















accounts	(see	§1,	 references	 in	note	7,	and	below),	 illuminant	varia-
tions	are	not	 simply	 “discounted”	by	 the	vision	 system,	but	 instead	
are	 regularly	 experienced	by	us.	 Both	 the	proposals	 of	Hilbert	 and	
Gert	make	this	accommodation	while	maintaining	a	form	of	objectiv-
ism,	but	neither	have	homed	in	on	the	fact	that	the	problem	is	more	






















The	recognition	of	 two	 forms	of	 layered	experiences	—	Complete	
and	 Incomplete	—	considerably	 increases	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	
the	account.	Cases	where	the	filter/illuminant	colour	and	surface	co-
lour	are	distinctly	discernible	suggest	Complete	layering.	Cases	where	
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colours	 to	be	 the	kind	of	 thing	 that	can	be	variously	 illuminated,	 in	
which	case	the	extra	dimension	is	“illumination	of	colour	x”,	where	x is	
still	uniquely	specifiable	in	a	suitable	HSL	space.







is	designed	 to	preserve	 reflectance	physicalism.	On	 this	 solution	co-
lours	are still classes	of	reflectances/productances,	located	in	an	HSL	
space.	The	perceptual	 variabilities	 in	 constancy	 cases	do	not	 under-
mine	this,	but	 instead	force	us	to	recognize	that	when	we	represent	
colours	we	do	not	solely	represent	them,	but	instead	represent	them	












ing	and	only	partially	understood	 issues	 in	physics	concerning	how	 illumi-





§5.1 The Minimalist solution (illumination variation as brightness variation).








‘delivers’	 he	means	 that	 the	 vision	 system	makes	 illumination	 infor-
mation	available	to	the	agent	for	conscious	perception.	Hilbert	then	
argues	that	this	illumination	must	be	represented	as	a	“property	of	the	
object”	 as	opposed	 to	 “a	property	of	 the	 light	 source”,	 and	 says	 that	
one	“consequence	of	this…is	that	the	colour	appearance	of	an	object	


















substitute	 for	HSL	her	preferred	 three-dimensional	model,	note	 that	 some	
models,	even	three-dimensional	ones,	may	not	fit	cleanly	into	the	Layering	
Thesis.	Unfortunately,	I	must	leave	these	modeling	troubles	to	another	time.





However,	 this	 analysis	 is	 not	 powerful	 enough	 to	 accommodate	
the	 fact	 that	 the	experienced	variations	 in	 Illumination	 cases	go	 far	
beyond	how	brightly	 and	dimly	 lit	 colours	 are,	 and	 instead	 include	
experienced	variations	in	at	least	hues	(but	perhaps	also	saturations).	
In	red	twilight	 there	 is	no	doubt	 that	 I	experience	redness,	and	that	
this	is	not	explainable	in	terms	of	how	brightly	or	dimly	lit	my	room	
is.	 If	colour	constancy	 is	occurring,	which	 it	can	 in	such	cases,	 then	











Recall	 the	 connection	 between	 reflectance	 physicalism	 and	 con-
stancy	 from	§1.	On	 traditional	 “discount	 the	 illuminant”	accounts	of	
49.	 Instead	 of	 the	 dimension	 “more	 or	 less	 brightly	 illuminated”,	 consider	 an	
analogue	dimension	 “more	or	 less	 revealed”,	 constructed	 specifically	 to	be	
conceptually	 distinct	 from	 illumination.	 It	may	 be	 that	 on	 further	 analysis	
admitting	 colour	 layers	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 capture	 some	 aspect	 of	 phenom-
enology	 concerning	 colour	 revelation,	 e. g.,	 that	 a	 transparent	 or	 opaque	
colour	 is	more	or	 less	 revealed	 in	 some	 context.	 In	 this	 case	 the	Layering	
approach	could	be	supplemented	by	some	such	analogue	of	Hilbert’s	 idea.	
However,	firstly,	this	outcome	would	not	affect	any	of	the	arguments	offered	
here	 for	 the	 inadequacy	of	Hilbert’s	proposal	or	 the	strengths	of	 the	Layer-
ing	approach.	At	worst	this	would	show	an	incompleteness	to	the	Layering	
approach	as	presented.	Secondly,	on	a	more	realist	reading	of	the	Layering	




core,	Russellian-friendly,	 reorientation	needed	 to	meet	 the	VC	Chal-
lenge.	However,	he	has	not	gone	far	enough:	his	solution	is	not	gen-





to	 constancy	 that	he	has	advocated	 for	years	 is	 typically	defined	by	
reference	 to	 Illuminant	 cases.48	 It	 is	 fair	 to	demand	more.	There	are	
various	Filter	and	Illuminant	cases	that	are	perceptually	similar,	and	












Furthermore,	 Hilbert’s	 proposal	 to	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 di-
mensions	of	colour	appearance	beyond	the	“traditional	three”	is	too	
limited.	His	focus	is	almost	exclusively	on	shadow	perceptions	and	
more	 generally	 on	 constancies	with	 achromatic	 illumination	 varia-
tions.	 This	 restriction	 supports	 thinking	 of	 the	 variabilities	 in	 con-
stancy	cases	as	mere	variations	in	how	“brightly”	or	“dimly”	a	colour	
is	 illuminated	 (Hilbert,	 2005,	 150).	This	perhaps	 suggests	Hilbert’s	
view,	 that	we	 should	 stick	 to	 a	 single	 represented	 (surface)	 colour	
but	increase	the	number	of	represented	colour	dimensions:	if	what	
48.	Note	 that	 since	 constancy	experiments	began	being	performed	using	 com-
puter	 screens	 the	 potential	 to	 conflate	 Illuminant	 and	 Filter	 cases	 has	 in-
creased	dramatically.	




It	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 these	 virtues	 hinge	 precisely	 on	 character-
izing	experienced	variations	in	constancy	scenarios	as	primarily	and	
fundamentally	 consisting	 of	 experienced	 variations	 in	 how	 brightly	












do	 change	 in	 relevant	 cases	 and	 concedes	 that	 there	 is	 no	 experi-
enced	constancy	 in	hues.	Any	account	of	 constancy	based	on	 these	
constraints	will	be	of	an	Absent	sort.	Unfortunately	for	the	objectivist,	


















light	 sources	are	 coloured,	and	 illuminants	are	not.	Constancy	 is	 in-
deed	one	of	 the	chief	 justifications	offered	 for	 their	view,	and	cases	



















searching	 for	 the	physical	property	with	which	 to	 identify	colours,	 “it	 is	of	
course	 the	object	 that	 looks	 colored	 (more	 strictly,	 its	 surface),	 and	so	 the	
relevant	physical	property	must	be	a	property	of	objects	(more	strictly,	sur-
faces)”	(2003,	9).	They	then	claim	that	colour	constancy	supports	their	view,	
for	 given	 constancy,	 and	 “[a]ssuming	 that	 our	 perceptions	 of	 color	 are	 of-
ten	veridical,	we	therefore	need	a	physical	property	of	objects	that	is	largely	
illumination-independent”	 (ibid).	 Light	 in addition to surfaces	 is	 not	 seriously	
considered.	 Instead,	 they	assert	 that	 to	 the	extent	 that	we	represent	 illumi-
nants	as	contributing	to	colour	(1997a,	fn	15;	2003,	54),	those	representations	
are	erroneous.	Also	see	Hilbert	(1992).










the	one	 that	 is	picked	out	by	 the	colour	appearance	experienced	 in	
normal	conditions,	while	 (b)	 resisting	 the	 threat	of	 colour	subjectiv-
ism.	This	is	achieved	by	divorcing	colours	from	the	HSL	features	that	






A	 brief	 comparison	 with	 Hilbert’s	 view	 is	 instructive.	 Ontologi-
cally,	 both	 agree	 that	 colours	 are	 illumination-independent	 features	










by	 the	 former	 or	 are	 they	 simply	ways	 colours	 present	 themselves	 to	 the	
world?	There	is	an	ontological	simplicity	to	the	latter,	but	given	that	elements	










and	 thus	stands	 in	 tension	with	anti-illuminant	colour	views	 like	re-
flectance	physicalism.	 I	 therefore	 see	no	 comfortable	 seat	on	which	
B&H	can	rest.




being	 differently	 illuminated”,	 it	 is	 perspectives	 afforded	by	 looking	
at	one	colour	 through	another.	Hilbert’s	 important	but	 conservative	
deviation	from	“discount	the	illuminant”	approaches	falls	short	of	the	
advance	needed	to	fully	meet	our	challenge.





Colours	 are	 categorical	properties	of	 surfaces,	 and	 they	
are	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	make	 those	
surfaces	appear	in	different	viewing	conditions.	One	im-
mediate	corollary	of	 this	view	 is	 that	colours	cannot	be	
characterized	 by	 giving	 precise	 coordinates	 in	 HS[L]52 




52.	Gert	 prefers	 referring	 to	HSB	 instead	 of	HSL	 space	 (Brightness	 instead	 of	
Lightness).	This	has	no	impact	on	our	discussion,	so	I	will	continue	to	refer	to	
the	latter.




ways	 to	 rectify	 this	problem,	one	of	which	 is	 to	bite	 the	bullet	 and	







Colours	 are	mere	 categorical properties.	 For	 example,	no	 instance	of	
the	property	BLUE	has	 a	hue,	 saturation,	or	 lightness,	only	blue	ap-
pearances	do.	An	instance	of	BLUE	can	present	itself	to	us	by	giving	
rise	to	a	variety	of	colour	appearances,	depending	on	the	perceptual	
circumstance.	Divorcing	HSL	from	colour	 is	non-trivial.	 It	 is	no	acci-
dent	that	colours	have	been	associated	with	HSL	properties	for	some	
time.	At	 least	on	one	deep-seated	 intuition	we	 take	colours	 to	have	













part of	 colour	 experience?	 If	 such	 colours	 are	 spoken	 of	 or	 seem-
ingly	prompted	by	experience	they	are	just	as	easily	accommodated	












variations	 and	 variations	 in	 colour	 appearance.	However,	 this	 inter-
pretation	of	constancy	is	not	an	experientially	realist	one.	
If	 colour	 experience	 is	described	by	 reference	 to	 colour	 appear-
ances,	 and	 those	 appearances	 are	 variable	 in	 Filter	 and	 Illuminant	
constancy	cases,	 then	where	 is	 the	constant	 colour	 in	one’s	experi-
ence?	 The	 constant	 colour	 is	 still	 in the world,	 for	 it	 is	 partially	 re-
sponsible	 for	 and	 is	 “picked	out”	 by	 its	 appearances.	 But	Gert	 has	
not	put	 forth	an	account	of	colour	experience	 that	 forces	us	 to	hold	







ject’s	experience	 is	constituted	by	 the	same	colour,	despite	 it	being	
differently	 illuminated	 and	 experienced	 as	 such	—	what	 is	 dropped	
is	adherence	 to	 the	 traditional	 three	dimensions	of	colour.	Such	an	
experientially	 realist	 account	 is	 seemingly	 unavailable	 to	Gert.	 On	
Gert’s	view	in	an	Illuminant	case	we	experience	changing	colour	ap-
pearances,	a	varied	flux	of	HSL	properties,	and	each	of	these	“picks	
out”	 the	 same	 categorical	 colour.	However,	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	
colour	appearances	 to	ensure	 that	 the	purported	 fact	 that	 the	same	
colour	is	picked	out	by	these	various	colour	appearances	is	itself	part	










constancy	on	offer	 suggests	 that	 these	 arguments	will	 not	 likely	 be	
compelling.	For	example,	a	conception	of	experienced	colour	layering	
is	as	easily	formulable	within	a	sense-datum	theory	(indirect	realism)	
that	asserts	 that	colours	belong	to	sense-data	(subjectivism),	as	 it	 is	
within	 a	direct	 realist	 colour	objectivism.	 I	 regard	 this	 as	 a	 positive	









of	 constancy	 supposed	 that	 only	 illumination	 variations	 were	 rele-
vant	(not	filter	variations),	and	that	we	could	characterize	constancy	
by	reference	to	an	ideal	case	in	which	those	variations	were	not	per-
ceived.	This	 relegated	 the	variable	element	 in	constancy	experience	























in	 HSL	 features.	 However,	 the	 latter	 occur	 not	 because	 surface	 co-
lours	do	not	themselves	have	stable	HSL	properties	but	because	they 
are not the only things in one’s line of sight that do.	Assuming	that	filters	
and	illuminants	have	HSL	properties,	and	that	in	constancy	scenarios	
we	are	viewing	the	(complete	or	partial)	HSL	properties	of	some	sur-
face	 through	 the	(complete	or	partial)	HSL	properties	of	 some	(one	
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Given	 these	 points	 the	 significance	 of	Cohen’s	 counterfactualist	
account	of	 constancy	can	be	more	 fully	appreciated.	 It	was	 initially	
useful	 primarily	 as	 an	 account	 that	 undermines	 the	 inference	 from	
constancy	to	colour	objectivism.	While	it	can	still	do	this,	given	the	
above	it	is	not	needed	for	the	task	and	its	limitations	are	more	appar-











personal	 judgements	based	on	what	 is	present	 in	experience	—	then	
the	Layering	account	of	constancy	appears	strong	relative	to	its	rivals.	
At	minimum,	 to	 accommodate	 constancy	 objectivists	 should	 add	 il-
luminants	to	their	standard	list	of	coloured	things	(surfaces,	films,	vol-
umes,	light	sources).
I	 have	 throughout	 emphasized	 that	 the	 Layering	 account	 of	 con-
stancy	 is	not	being	offered	to	explain	all constancy	cases.	 It	explains	
a	 host	 of	 Filter	 cases	 and	 credibly	 explains	 many	 Illuminant	 ones.	
However,	my	primary	 aim	has	been	 to	 articulate	 this	option	 and	 its	






















broader	view	 (but	 instead	only	discussed	his	 account	of	 constancy),	
layered	colours	create	a	challenge	 for	him.	Cohen	conceives	of	 indi-
vidual	 colours	 as	 relations	 between	 surfaces,	 conditions	 of	 viewing,	
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